Mobile & Native App Security
Securely set up OAuth2 for Mobile Apps, Browser Apps, and Single Page Apps
Read this guide to learn how to implement authentication and authorization for mobile, browser, and native apps with better user experience and buffed security.
You might ask yourself: “Why do I need a guide to mobile and native app authorization and OAuth2? I’ll simply use the OAuth 2.0 Implicit flow and I’m good to go, or the OAuth2 Resource Owner Password Credentials Flow! Please don’t - and I’ll explain why. If you need a refresh on OAuth2, check out the excellent guide from DigitalOcean.
First, you will learn why the old way of solving mobile app authorization is neither good practice nor secure. Second, you will be introduced to the OAuth2 Authorize Code flow with Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) for public clients. Third, you will be supplied with links to open source software capable of solving the introduced flows and features.
What To Avoid From Now On
As author & maintainer of various open source projects in the area of OAuth2, OpenID Connect, Access Control and API Security, I have seen a lot of questions, environments, and use cases. I will quickly walk through the most common ones and explain why you should avoid those.
The OAuth2 Resource Owner Password Credentials Flow
Typically, mobile apps are first-party (written by the company’s developers) clients. Product managers and designers want to keep the user experience clean. It is not uncommon that developers are asked to present the user with an in-app login screen (“Please enter your username and password”) which exchanges those credentials for a token which allows the app to access some APIs. In the context of OAuth2, this is usually achieved using the OAuth2 Resource Owner Password Credentials Flow.
Unfortunately, this practice makes it possible for attackers to create a counterfeit app which logs user credentials. The user is not able to distinguish the login screen in the counterfeit from legitimate apps, because there is no domain name, no TLS certificate, and more broadly no trusted environment (Browser). If the attackers can push a counterfeit app to the app store, users - used to enter their credentials in the app - will not become suspicious.
Let’s take a look at an example. The two screenshots below are from two different apps. The one on the left is the original app, the one on the right the counterfeit one. Can you spot the difference? Me neither, it’s a perfect replicate. There are, of course, some limitations to this attack. For one, the counterfeit app has to make it on the user’s phone. Unfortunately, counterfeit apps are so common, there’s even an article on Lifehacker (“How to Spot Fake Apps in Apple's App Store and Google Play”) on this topic.
Without a browser address bar, there is no way to distinguish between a legitimate and an illegimitate app.
If a browser is involved, the user will see the URL and be able to validate the TLS certificate if in doubt. Let’s take a look at the two login screens again, but this time in a browser. You should be able to spot which one is the phishing site and which one isn’t.
Without the browser address bar, you can easily spot the illegitimate app (right).
It becomes apparent that you should train the user’s eye and opt for authentication & authorization through a trusted environment (the browser). While, regrettably, some users will remain susceptible to phishing attacks, you can certainly reduce the overall success rate of phishing attacks against your services.
The OAuth2 Implicit Flow
The OAuth2 implicit Flow was the go-to flow for mobile apps, single page apps, and native apps. The IETF summarizes this flow as follows:
The most prominent downside to this flow is that no refresh tokens may be issued. Every time an access token expires, the user must redo the whole authorize dance (open browser -> authenticate -> authorize) - not a great user experience.
Another issue is that Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) can not protect the OAuth2 Implicit Flow. The IETF explicitly states that this flow is not recommended for use with native & mobile applications:
The OAuth2 implicit grant authorization flow generally works with the practice of performing the authorization request in the browser and receiving the authorization response via URI-based inter-app communication. However, as the implicit flow cannot be protected by PKCE, the use of the Implicit Flow with native apps is NOT RECOMMENDED.
Access tokens granted via the implicit flow also cannot be refreshed without user interaction, making the authorization code grant flow -- which can issue refresh tokens -- the more practical option for native app authorizations that require refreshing of access tokens.
Embedded User Agents
The IETF encourages developers to avoid embedded user agents, sometimes referred to as web-views, and use external user-agents, typically the browser. Here is why:
Embedded user-agents are unsafe for use by third parties to the authorization server by definition, as the app that hosts the embedded user-agent can access the user's full authentication credential, not just the OAuth authorization grant that was intended for the app.
In typical web-view-based implementations of embedded user-agents, the host application can record every keystroke entered in the login form to capture usernames and passwords, automatically submit forms to bypass user consent, and copy session cookies and use them to perform authenticated actions as the user. - Source
What To Do Instead
Now you know what to avoid. Let’s talk about what to do instead!
The OAuth2 Authorize Code Flow With Public Clients
The OAuth2 Authorize Code Flow provides the means for clients, which can not keep passwords secret, to request authorization on a user’s behalf. This is possible with a public client. The only differences between confidential (regular) and public clients are that no secret was issued to that client, and that the client is explicitly intended for use with mobile, browser, and native apps.
Public clients are capable of performing all flows except the Resource Owner Password Credentials flow and the Client Credentials flow. They are also allowed to request OpenID Connect ID Tokens, and refresh expired access or ID tokens. Other than the missing client secret, the flow is executed in the same way as the regular OAuth2 Authorize Code flow. It is recommended to send the client ID in the POST body or the URL query, as HTTP Basic Authorization does not work well (if at all) with an empty password field
Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE)
The OAuth2 Implicit and Authorize Code Flows are vulnerable in the context of mobile and native apps, specifically when custom redirect URI schemes are used that are not protected by Transport Layer Security (TLS).
If an attacker manages to register a malicious application on the client device and registers a custom URI scheme that is also used by the legitimate application, it is possible for the attacker to intercept the authorize code and obtain its access token.
To mitigate this attack, the legitimate app generates a so-called code challenge
and code verifier. The code verifier is derived from the code challenge. There
are multiple ways of generating the code challenge, the most secure one is to
code_challenge = BASE64URL-ENCODE(SHA256(ASCII(code_verifier)))
The code challenge is submitted to the OAuth2 Authorization Server during the Authorization Request, when the browser hits the `/oauth2/auth` endpoint. The code verifier, only known to the legitimate application, is transmitted when the authorization code is exchanged for access and refresh tokens. The OAuth2 Authorization Server does not issue access and refresh tokens when an invalid code verifier is submitted. The malicious app is therefore not able to use the authorization code and thus the vulnerability is mitigated.
Open Source Technology
OAuth2, OpenID Connect, PKCE, JWTs, … - these standards as useful as they are complicated. It is well known that developers should never roll their own crypto, unless of course they are a cryptographer. The same should apply to these standards. I strongly encourage everyone in the community to rely on adopted, tested, and reliable open source technology. These topics have been covered in various programming languages and are easy to integrate.
Ok, so let’s take a look at what technology you can use to provide and consume OAuth2, OpenID Connect, and Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE). Some of the technology presented is written and maintained by ORY. Everything is licensed with the Apache 2.0 License.
OAuth2 Server: ORY Hydra
An OAuth2 and OpenID Connect server that integrates with existing identity management solutions. ORY Hydra is written in Go and compiles on any operating system without virtual machines or external dependencies. Its Docker image is only 5mb, and the architecture is designed for cloud environments: effortless horizontal scaling, no configuration files, 12factor compliant.
ORY Hydra supports all features presented in this article. If you are looking for a capable OAuth2 server that works with your existing login system, then check out the project on GitHub.
OAuth2 Client: AppAuth
Where can I find help?
Thank you for reading! I hope you learned something useful! If this was of any help, you can follow me on GitHub and Twitter and see what I’m up to next. If you wish to support ORY’s mission of making secure developer tools affordable and accessible, consider supporting us on Patreon.